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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the impact of Argentina trade liberalization during the nineties on 
the industry wage premium structure. We find that accounting for unobserved time-
invariant industry characteristics is crucial. When we do not control for industry fixed 
effects, we find that workers in protected sectors receive lower wages. However, 
introducing industry fixed effects reverses the results; tariff protection creates sector 
specific rents that are in part translated to workers in terms of greater wages. Since 
Argentina’s tariff structure during this period protected relatively more sectors 
employing higher proportions of skilled workers, nineties trade policy may have had 
an adverse effect on Argentina’s income distribution. 
RESUMEN 
Este trabajo estudia el impacto de la liberalización comercial argentina en los noventa 
sobre la estructura de las primas salariales sectoriales. Encontramos que resulta 
crucial controlar por características sectoriales inobservables e invariantes en el 
tiempo. Cuando no incluimos efectos fijos por industrias, encontramos que los 
trabajadores en sectores protegidos reciben menores salarios. Al incluirlos se revierten 
los resultados; la protección crea rentas sectoriales que se trasladan a los trabajadores 
vía mayores salarios. Como la estructura tarifaria argentina durante este período 
protegió relativamente más a sectores calificados, la política comercial podría haber 
tenido un efecto adverso en la distribución del ingreso. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Trade economists have long investigated the relationship between trade 
liberalization and wage premium paid to skilled workers. The natural question 
to be answered is whether globalization and deepening of international trade 
could be responsible for the growth in relative earnings of skilled workers 
during the 1980s and 1990s in developed and developing countries respectively. 
Maybe the most immediate way of thinking why trade could be associated with 
movements in skill premium is to reason in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. 
Countries have different proportions of skilled and unskilled workers, and so 
do the goods that each country produces and exports. If this is true, then 
opening to trade is analogous to a skill transfer between economies. A country 
with relative scarcity of skilled workers would export unskilled-labor-intensive 
products and import skilled-labor-intensive products, and then opening the 
economy would be equivalent to an increase in its relative supply of skilled 
workers and a decline in its relative supply of unskilled workers. In this 
framework, opening the economy to trade would have an overall impact over 
the premium of skilled workers. We call this, an impact in the skill premium. 
So if we rely in the Heckscher-Ohlin model for explaining the rise in the skill 
premium in developing countries (and in Latin America in particular) in late 
1980s and early 1990s, we find a priori a contradiction. As long as these 
countries are unskilled-labor abundant, one would expect that their opening to 
trade should lead to a decline in their skill premium and inequality during the 
nineties. But, at least in Argentina, the effect we observe is the opposite. 
Should we conclude that Heckscher-Ohlin is not working? Galiani and Porto 
(2010) provide an example on how to study the relationship between trade and 
wages in a Stolper-Samuelson framework with bargaining power of unions. 
However, extra assumptions are not necessary to reconcile facts with the 
classical model. Since tariff reductions in Latin American countries were 
disproportionately larger in unskilled-labor intensive sectors (Attanasio, 
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Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004; Hanson and Harrison, 1999; Pavcnik, Blom, 
Goldberg and Schady, 2004), the classic model could still be working. Given 
that tariff cuts were larger in unskilled-labor intensive sectors, the economy-
wide return to unskilled workers should have decreased. Nevertheless, the 
evidence shown on those studies is not sufficient to conclude that the 
mechanism through which trade affect wages is the one described by Stolper-
Samuelson years ago (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004). 
More recent models of trade point out the relevant role that industry affiliation 
plays in determining how trade affects wages (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005). In 
these models, at least in the short run, labor is not perfectly mobile across 
sectors as was in Stolper-Samuelson (Heckman and Pagés, 2000). This 
assumption is important for the generation of sector specific rents that do not 
evaporate in the short run due to labor stickiness. Workers with similar levels 
of education or skills (even more, with similar levels of all observable 
characteristics such as gender, age, formality, etc.), could be affected differently 
by international trade just because of their sector or industry affiliation. When 
two workers that are equal in all observable characteristics receive different 
wages because they participate in different industries, we will say that there 
exists an industry wage premium. In this type of models, since workers are not 
completely mobile across sectors, tariff cuts translate into proportional 
industry wage premiums reductions. 
Also, classical models of trade suppose perfect competition in product and labor 
markets. However, trade policy can affect industry wage premiums in 
frameworks of imperfect competition. An example of that comes from 
Levinsohn (1993), who use Turkish drastic manufacturing trade liberalization 
in 1984 for testing the hypothesis of import as market discipline in an oligopoly 
model. He finds that sectors with higher import penetration reduced markups 
in a larger proportion. In this context, trade liberalization of the more 
unskilled-labor-intensive sectors in Latin America should have also played a 
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role in reducing industry wage premium in sectors with a low fraction of skilled 
workers. 
Our purpose in this paper is to estimate industry wage premiums in Argentina 
during the 1990s and relate them to trade policy in each sector following a two-
step methodology estimation used by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005). We find 
that, once we control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics, 
tariff reductions that took place in the 1990s reduced industry wage premiums 
in the manufacturing sectors under analysis. Since tariff reductions were 
larger for sectors who used a high proportion of unskilled workers, that trade 
liberalization in Argentina may have contributed to raise inequality in the last 
decade of 20th century. It is worth mentioning that our results do not refer to 
changes in the skill premium per se, but to the premium that industries pay to 
workers with the same level of skills. In this sense, if trade liberalization also 
had a positive effect on the overall skill premium of the economy, low-skill 
workers could have been hit twice. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we motivate 
the work by describing trade reforms made by Argentina in the nineties. 
Section 3 is a brief description of the data used in the paper. In Section 4, we 
present our regression model and explain the empirical methodology we follow. 
In Section 5, we show our results, and Section 6 is left for conclusions. 
 
2 Argentina's Background 
 
Argentina’s economic performance during the 1980s was quite poor, and by the 
end of the decade the economy was broken down. Growth of real output was 
stagnated, financial markets were collapsed and prices were rising largely due 
to currency depreciation. The hyperinflation of 1989 finally provided the 
impetus for the economic reforms applied in the early nineties. Trade 
liberalization policy was one of the basic instruments included in the 
5 
 
stabilization program which meant a new way of introducing the country in 
international trade. 
Trade liberalization started gradually as a unilateral policy in 1988 but made a 
strong impact only after 1990. The program included both a reduction in 
nominal protection and a significant reduction of tariff position that were 
subject to quantitative restrictions. By the end of 1991, nominal tariffs had 
been lowered to an average level of 12 percent and all import licenses had been 
eliminated (Galiani and Sanguinetti, 2003).  
Trade liberalization significantly impacted trade flows. As can be seen in 
Figure I, between 1990 and 1998 the share of imports on GDP almost 
triplicated, going from 4.63% to 12.93%. 
 
Figure I. Evolution of imports (% of GDP) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on WDI, World Bank. 
 
Also, Table I reports import penetration defined as imports to value-added 
disaggregated at industry level from 1993 to 1999. Import penetration 
increased in all sectors during this period, with the exception of beverages and 
footwear. On average, this index more than duplicated. 
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Table I. Import Penetration by Manufacturing Sector 
Manufacturing sector   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
  Food products 12.9 14.6 13.3 14.6 13.7 17.0 14.4 
  Beverages   4.7 4.1 3.8 3.3 4.4 4.7 4.1 
  Tobacco   0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 - - - 
  Textiles   36.5 36.2 41.3 52.5 51.2 56.8 49.7 
  Apparel (except fur apparel) 28.4 30.0 26.8 26.7 - - - 
  
Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of 
fur 
12.6 15.5 11.5 18.7 26.8 50.5 44.3 
  Footwear   44.9 38.3 32.8 34.6 22.3 28.4 36.1 
  Wood production (non furniture) 28.6 40.4 55.4 63.1 61.5 67.0 62.4 
  Paper and paper products 79.7 86.5 98.4 119.2 82.2 80.2 83.4 
  Printing and related activities 7.5 9.3 11.6 11.2 - - - 
  Refine petroleum products 9.9 18.0 22.6 21.5 30.2 45.8 26.0 
  Basic chemicals 262.9 217.6 238.0 285.0 - - - 
  Other chemical products 32.5 38.7 39.2 44.5 - - - 
  Rubber products 64.8 66.5 70.5 88.4 109.4 107.6 153.7 
  Plastics products 23.2 29.5 30.9 29.5 40.3 37.9 31.9 
  Glass and glass products 26.4 31.6 30.9 32.9 39.9 51.7 47.2 
  Non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 11.7 14.3 15.7 15.9 - - - 
  Basic iron and steel 51.1 48.8 45.7 44.6 59.6 63.6 74.7 
  
Basic precious and non-ferrous 
metals 
75.6 81.2 84.2 107.5 131.4 246.8 155.9 
  Other metal products 33.2 44.9 53.5 52.9 67.6 69.5 67.1 
  General purpose machinery  184.9 264.8 299.2 291.2 351.8 356.2 403.2 
  Domestic appliances n.e.c. 218.2 268.7 296.2 307.5 369.0 411.8 359.0 
  
Medical appliances and instruments 
of precision 
208.5 297.7 247.3 359.9 393.5 351.8 378.8 
  Motor vehicles 113.8 137.9 141.4 164.3 222.3 278.2 322.6 
  Furniture   18.2 17.5 13.3 19.9 47.2 46.3 52.7 
  Other manufacturing 171.6 188.5 217.5 234.0 448.0 422.6 415.1 
  Average   67.8 78.5 82.3 94.0 128.6 139.7 139.1 
Source: own elaboration based on Nicita and Olarreaga database (2007).  
 
Industry is well known to be a low-skill-labor sector relative to the average 
skill level of the economy. This can be seen in Table II, which shows the share 
of employment by skill group for the wide economy and for the manufacturing 
sector. Thus, given that manufacturing as a whole is a low-skill-labor intensive 
sector, if tariff reductions are larger for manufactures that employ high 
proportions of unskilled workers, the impact of trade liberalization on income 
distribution would be twice negative.  
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 Table II. Share of skilled workers by sector  
  Share of skilled workers (%) 
  1991 1995 1999 
Manufacturing 9.99 12.01 14.96 
Services 22.86 21.49 23.60 
Total economy except manufacturing 22.87 21.56 21.12 
Total economy 19.65 19.78 19.78 
Source: own elaboration based on EPH (INDEC). 
 
In Figure II we show the evolution of mean tariff for skilled and unskilled 
industries. We define as unskilled workers those with [0-8] years of education, 
and as skilled workers those with 9 or more. For each year, we classify a sector 
as skilled if the share of skilled workers is greater than the share of unskilled 
workers, and vice versa. In most cases we find that the sector classification is 
stable along time. However, since we are working with household surveys 
disaggregated at the 3 digit level, in some years we have sectors with few 
observations, and therefore it could happen that an industry that seems to be 
skilled abundant, in one year it has a larger share of unskilled workers than 
usual. We decide to dismiss these cases and classify a sector in each group for 
all years according to the category that predominates all over the panel. As a 
result, a sector will be considered either skilled or unskilled for every year in 
our data. 
It can be seen that in the nineties tariffs reductions were relatively larger for 
unskilled sectors, so Argentina’s trade policy during the nineties favored 
skilled industries relatively more. 
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Figure II. Evolution of tariffs by skill group 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Galiani and Porto (2010) and EPH (INDEC). 
   
At the same time, inequality rose considerably, a common trend in Latin 
American countries during this decade. Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015) 
document that income inequality rose sharply in the region in the late 1980s 
and in the 1990s, probably as the result of recurrent macroeconomic crisis and 
some structural transformations. Figure III and IV show the wage gap between 
high skilled (14 or more years of education) and low skilled workers (8 or less) 
and the Gini coefficient on hourly wage in main job, respectively, for Argentina 
between 1991 and 2000.  
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Figure III. Wage gap 
 
Source: own elaboration based on EPH (INDEC). 
 
Figure IV. Gini coefficient on hourly wages 
 
Source: own elaboration based on EPH (INDEC). 
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Given these two stylized facts, in the rest of this paper we investigate if trade 
liberalization could have been one of the factors behind the sharp increase in 
inequality. 
 
3 Data 
 
We use four different types of data: household-level data from the Permanent 
National Household Survey (EPH) carried out by the Argentinian national 
statistical office (INDEC) and standardized following the procedure used in 
SEDLAC (CEDLAS-Universidad Nacional de La Plata and World Bank); 
industry-level data from the trade and production database compiled by Nicita 
and Olarreaga (2007); import tariff data used by Galiani and Porto (2010); and 
multilateral real exchange rate series for Argentina published by the Central 
Bank of Argentina. 
Household level data from EPH (INDEC) contains information on earnings, 
worker characteristics and industry affiliation. Information is homogenized to 
be consistent across time. We restrict the sample to individuals in working age 
(15 to 65 years old) who report positive labor earnings. We use surveys for the 
period 1991-1999. 
The variables that we use from the household surveys in our analysis are labor 
earnings, age, gender, education, sector of employment, geographic location 
and formality status. These variables are used in our Mincer regressions in 
which we relate labor earnings with worker characteristics and include 
dummies for sector affiliation. The coefficients accompanying these dummies 
reflect industry wage premium, that is, differences in wages between workers 
that are exactly the same, except for their industry affiliation. The definition of 
sector of employment is expressed at the 3-digit level of the ISIC Revision 3 
classification, so we match survey information to this classification using 
United Nations Statistics Division concordance tables. 
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Trade and production database from Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) collects sector 
data at the 3-digit level of ISIC Revision 2 classification sector. We use 
concordance tables again to translate them to Revision 3. This data contains 
information about imports, exports, value-added, output, number of employees 
and other variables, all at the sector level. With this data we construct two 
variables of relevance: i) productivity, defined as the ratio of output (or value 
added) to number of employees; and ii) trade openness, defined as the ratio of 
imports to output (or value-added). Both productivity and trade openness are 
interesting variables for explaining industry wage premiums. We have this 
information for the years 1993-1999. 
Import tariff data is the same used by Galiani and Porto (2010). It consists on 
historical data collected by the authors from the Guía Práctica del Exportador e 
Importador, a monthly publication that provides current tariffs at the most 
disaggregated level of the National Import Tariff Classification (NADI). We 
have this information for the period 1991-1999. 
Finally, we use multilateral real exchange rate data series published by the 
Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
4 Empirical Strategy 
 
We follow Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) in investigating the effects of trade 
policy on wage inequality, who suggest a two-stage estimation methodology. In 
the first stage, the log of worker i’s wage is regressed on a vector of worker i’s 
characteristics, including age, gender, level of education, dummies for formality 
status and region of residence. Besides, we incorporate dummies for industry 
affiliation. The coefficients on the industry dummies are interpreted as 
industry wage premiums, and represent the part of the variation in wages that 
is explained solely by workers’ industry affiliation, and not by workers’ 
individual characteristics. In other words, they represent the difference in 
wages between workers that are exactly the same, except from the industry 
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where they work. In this stage eq. (1) is regressed separately for each year on 
our sample: 
 
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽𝐶 + 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑝𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡      (1) 
 
where ln(𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) is the log of worker i’s wage in sector j and time t; 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the 
vector of worker i’s characteristics in sector j and time t and 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 are dummies 
for industry affiliation of worker i in sector j and time t. 
The use of individual characteristics allows us to control for compositional 
differences across sectors. Average industry wages may vary across industries 
because of the different types of workers that each sector usually employs, and 
consequently sectors with a large share of skilled workers are likely to have 
higher average wages. If these industries have low tariffs, one would wrongly 
predict that protecting industries in the form of higher tariffs would lead to a 
decrease in their worker’s wages. Note that this problem would not exist if 
industry composition were constant over time, since industry fixed effects could 
capture differences in composition between sectors. 
Once we obtain the industry wage premium coefficients (𝑝𝑗𝑡), we compute a 
normalized industry wage premium variable, expressing each 𝑝𝑗𝑡 coefficient as 
deviation from the employment-weighted average industry wage premium (𝑤𝑡), 
which is given by: 
 
𝑤𝑡 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑗
 
 
where 𝑠𝑗𝑡 is the share of employment of sector j in year t. So, the normalized 
industry wage premium (𝜑𝑗𝑡 ) is given by: 
 
𝜑𝑗𝑡 = 𝑝𝑗𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡 
13 
 
 
This new variable is interpreted as the proportional difference in wages for a 
worker in a given industry relative to an average worker in all industries with 
the same observable characteristics. 
Then we pool these normalized industry wage premiums over time and regress 
them on trade industry characteristics (included in the vector 𝑇𝑗𝑡), namely 
tariffs, value of imports, degree of openness, productivity, multilateral real 
exchange rate and some interactions. Additionally, we include year and sector 
fixed effects (𝐷𝑡 and 𝐷𝑗, respectively). 
Eq. (2) estimates the response of relative wages to trade policy changes, 
controlling for other observables.  
 
 𝜑𝑗𝑡 = 𝑇𝑗𝑡𝛽𝑇 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝐷𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡      (2) 
 
Although there probably are other variables affecting industry wage premiums, 
data constraints prevent us from including them in the analysis. For instance, 
if omitted variables are correlated with tariff changes, the OLS estimated 
coefficients would be biased. However, if these variables affecting industry 
wage premiums are not correlated with trade policy changes, or if they are time 
invariant, our estimated trade policy effects would be correct.  
Another problem arises if we think that policymakers take into account 
industry characteristics when deciding the degree of protection they will apply. 
This could be captured in the second stage of the estimation through industry 
fixed effects, if political economy factors that are important do not change much 
over time. However, if they do, for example responding to other variables that 
also affect wages, our estimations would be biased. Consequently, we 
instrument sector tariffs in Argentina with tariffs on the same sectors in Chile. 
The identification assumption is that Chilean tariffs are not correlated with 
any variable that affects industry wage premiums in Argentina other than 
tariffs in Argentina. As is well known, we can check correlation between sector 
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tariffs in both countries looking at the estimator of the first stage of two stage 
least squares. 
Finally, as the dependent variable in eq. (2) is estimated, it is measured with 
error. Although this does not affect consistency if this measurement error is 
uncorrelated with the independent variables, additional noise is introduced in 
eq. (2), which increases the variance of the estimators. To account for the fact 
that usually the noise in the dependent variable differs across sectors and 
depends on the variance of the estimated coefficients on industry dummies in 
eq. (1), we use weighted least squares (WLS) following Krueger and Summers 
(1988). This methodology consists on approximating the standard errors of the 
normalized wage premium coefficients by the standard errors of the coefficients 
of the original regression, and for the omitted base category by the standard 
error of the constant term. 
 
4.1 Instrumental variables 
 
As is well known, the fixed effects estimation does not control for unobserved 
time variant industry heterogeneity. Two problems may arise. First, if there 
are omitted variables in equation (2) that vary over time and are correlated 
simultaneously with industry wages and tariff protection, our OLS and WLS 
estimations will be biased. For example, exogenous shocks to world prices. 
Second, there could be time-varying selection into industries if trade 
liberalization leads to industries’ compositional effects based on unobserved 
workers’ characteristics. This bias could make coefficients be either under or 
over estimated. If more able workers tend to leave sectors with larger tariff 
cuts, the sample we get will be less able due to attrition. Therefore, our OLS 
and WLS estimators will be biased upwards. On the contrary, if we think that 
industries that experiment larger tariff cuts will dismiss less able workers, the 
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sample will be composed by more able workers and the tariff coefficient will be 
biased downwards.3     
In order to solve these potential problems, we instrument sector tariffs in 
Argentina with tariffs on the same sectors in Chile. The identification 
assumption is that Chilean tariffs are not correlated with any variable that 
affects industry wage premiums in Argentina other than Argentinean tariffs. 
Correlation between sector tariffs in both countries can be examined by looking 
at the estimator of the first stage of two stage least squares. 
 
5 Results 
 
The results we are interested in are those related to the second equation of the 
empirical strategy4. We want to know if changes in trade policy affect industry 
wage premiums through different hypothetical channels such as labor 
stickiness or imperfect competition in labor or product markets.  
Although we count on tariff information since 1991, output data is only 
available since 1993, and that is why our regression sample consists on twenty-
six industries with available data for the period 1993-1999. Six industries lack 
output information for the last three years but we decided to keep them 
anyway, in order to avoid taking any arbitrary decision with possible 
endogeneity bias behind.   
Our most relevant results are shown in Table III. Columns (1) and (2) show 
estimations of eq. (2) using OLS method, columns (3) and (4) using WLS and (5) 
and (6) using IV.  
We should remember that OLS has two potential problems. First, as the 
dependent variable is estimated, it is measured with error. Although this does 
not affect consistency if this measurement error is uncorrelated with the 
independent variables, additional noise is introduced in eq. (2), which increases 
                                                          
3 See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005). 
4 Estimations of equation (1) are shown in Table A.I. in the Appendix.  
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the variance of the estimators. To account for the fact that usually the noise in 
the dependent variable differs across sectors and depends on the variance of 
the estimated coefficients on industry dummies in eq. (1), we use weighted 
least squares (WLS). Second, there could be problems arising from omitted 
variables or selection. If there are omitted variables in equation (2) that vary 
over time and are correlated simultaneously with industry wages and tariff 
protection, our OLS and WLS estimations will be biased. Additionally, there 
could be time-varying selection into industries if trade liberalization leads to 
industries’ compositional effects based on unobserved workers’ characteristics. 
This bias could make coefficients be either under or over estimated. We address 
these problems using IV.  
Specifications (1), (3) and (5) are regressions of the normalized industry 
premium in tariffs with three controls: openness (imports/value-added), 
productivity (value-added/number of employees) and MRER, as well as year 
fixed effects. Specifications (2), (4) and (6) are the same but include industry 
fixed effects. The inclusion of productivity as a control variable results of 
importance because otherwise we could be estimating spurious correlation. If 
more productive industries pay higher wages, and they receive the lowest 
protection because government thinks that they can survive international 
competition without it, we could falsely conclude that lower tariffs raise 
industry wage premiums when the factor behind the higher wages is just 
higher productivity. 
It is remarkable the importance of accounting for unobserved time-invariant 
industry characteristics, since doing it reverses the sign of the tariff coefficient 
independently of the method used, making it positive (and statistically 
significant in WLS and IV) for explaining industry wage premiums. The 
reversion of the sign of the tariff coefficient is in line with the results of 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), who also find that including industry fixed 
effects turns the coefficient from negative to positive in their study for 
Colombia’s liberalization.  
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Table III. Estimation results 
              
  OLS WLS IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Tariffs -0.008** 0.008 -0.008*** 0.008** -0.030 0.067* 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.038) (0.039) 
Openness -0.001 0.037 0.018*** 0.039 -0.021 -0.017 
  (0.012) (0.035) (0.007) (0.025) (0.024) (0.051) 
Productivity 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001* 0.000 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
MRER 0.009 0.004 0.013* 0.006 0.026 -0.051 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.035) (0.038) 
              
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 158 158 158 158 132 132 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normalized Industry Wage Premium is the 
dependent variable. Specifications (5) and (6) have less observations because data of Chilean tariffs is not 
available for 1996.  
 
As is expected, when we go from OLS to WLS, we gain efficiency, because WLS 
uses the inverse of the standard deviation of the wage premium coefficients 
estimated in the first stage as weights in the second regression. On the other 
hand, going from WLS to IV results in a larger coefficient of tariffs. This is in 
line with the hypothesis that industries that experimented larger tariff cuts 
have dismissed less able workers, resulting in a sample composed by more able 
workers, making the tariff coefficient biased downwards. Another possible 
reason could be that there are omitted variables that are correlated both with 
tariffs and industry wage premiums. 
Our preferred specification is (6) as it solves the potential problems of 
endogeneity and selection. The magnitude of the effects is economically 
significant. For example, a reduction of 50-percentage points in tariffs leads to 
a 3.35% decline in the wage premium in this industry. This positive correlation 
between industry wage premiums and tariffs is consistent with the existence of 
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sector rents that are reduced by trade liberalization, or, alternatively, with the 
predictions of some models of trade in which there exists labor stickiness across 
sectors. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
Like many other Latin American countries, Argentina went through a broad 
liberalization program during the nineties. At the same time, wage inequality 
rose largely over this period.  
Using data from household surveys and tariffs for Argentina, we find that 
worker affiliation is an important factor for explaining labor earnings, and that 
trade protection creates specific industry rents. We also find that accounting 
for unobservable time-invariant industry characteristics is crucial for 
understanding this relationship. Once we control for industry fixed effects in 
our regressions, we find that tariff protection has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on industry wage premiums. 
Combining the above results with Argentina’s tariff structure during this 
period, which protected relatively more sectors that employed higher 
proportions of skilled workers, it could be possible that nineties trade policy 
has contributed to the rise in inequality documented in the literature.  
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Appendix 
Table A.I. first stage estimations 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
                
Formality dummy (=1 
if formal) 
0.113*** 0.114*** 0.168*** 0.051 0.222*** 0.192*** 0.314*** 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) 
Age 
0.057*** 0.039*** 0.068*** 0.060*** 0.043*** 0.052*** 0.040*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age^2 
-0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender dummy (=1 if 
men) 
0.106*** 0.164*** 0.117*** 0.297*** 0.197*** 0.255*** 0.173*** 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036) (0.031) (0.033) 
Beverages 
0.297*** 0.312*** 0.097 -0.034 -0.055 0.171*** 0.066 
(0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.082) (0.077) (0.062) (0.067) 
Tobacco 
0.467 0.472** 0.596*** 0.333   0.325 0.485** 
(0.662) (0.208) (0.160) (0.281)   (0.225) (0.205) 
Textiles 
-0.025 -0.036 -0.048 -0.240*** -0.100 0.147* -0.140 
(0.070) (0.073) (0.075) (0.089) (0.071) (0.087) (0.101) 
Apparel (except fur 
apparel) 
0.058 0.118** -0.220*** 0.055 -0.152*** 0.156*** 0.030 
(0.060) (0.058) (0.053) (0.057) (0.054) (0.047) (0.052) 
Dressing and dyeing 
of fur; articles of fur 
  0.497 0.002 -0.048   -0.382 0.304 
  (0.514) (0.304) (0.203)   (0.274) (0.629) 
Footwear 
0.145** 0.094 -0.033 -0.137** -0.095 0.066 -0.051 
(0.070) (0.065) (0.067) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.069) 
Wood production (non 
furniture) 
0.188* 0.202 0.071 -0.055 -0.099 0.069 0.099 
(0.103) (0.130) (0.156) (0.144) (0.123) (0.109) (0.093) 
Paper and paper 
products 
0.185** 0.210** 0.172** -0.060 0.121 0.105 -0.058 
(0.078) (0.082) (0.079) (0.094) (0.081) (0.073) (0.090) 
Printing and related 
activities 
0.192** 0.314*** 0.012 0.073 0.100 0.182*** 0.067 
(0.085) (0.074) (0.067) (0.080) (0.070) (0.057) (0.066) 
Refine petroleum 
products 
0.570*** 0.532*** 0.438*** 0.513*** 0.628*** 0.337*** 0.275** 
(0.159) (0.193) (0.122) (0.195) (0.173) (0.091) (0.125) 
Basic chemicals 
0.284*** -0.251 0.232* 0.036 -0.006 0.362*** 0.473*** 
(0.108) (0.189) (0.131) (0.143) (0.158) (0.095) (0.141) 
Other chemical 
products 
0.203*** 0.257*** 0.336*** 0.140** 0.266*** 0.337*** 0.230*** 
(0.062) (0.059) (0.053) (0.055) (0.056) (0.048) (0.054) 
Rubber products 
0.079 0.067 -0.040 0.215** 0.229** 0.044 0.156 
(0.083) (0.107) (0.094) (0.096) (0.104) (0.098) (0.110) 
Plastics products 
0.011 0.119* -0.007 -0.037 -0.039 0.132** 0.078 
(0.073) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.066) (0.055) (0.061) 
Glass and glass 
products 
0.539*** 0.326*** 0.149 0.302*** 0.301** 0.323** 0.321*** 
(0.118) (0.109) (0.106) (0.113) (0.133) (0.137) (0.116) 
Non-metallic mineral 0.339*** 0.330*** -0.120 -0.155* -0.279*** 0.025 0.063 
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products n.e.c. (0.085) (0.089) (0.086) (0.086) (0.079) (0.065) (0.075) 
Basic iron and steel 
0.097 0.104 -0.221* -0.085 0.093 0.155* 0.287*** 
(0.114) (0.098) (0.120) (0.128) (0.104) (0.093) (0.099) 
Basic precious and 
non-ferrous metals 
0.114 0.206 0.267 0.164 0.173 0.350* 0.246 
(0.408) (1.331) (0.209) (0.202) (0.592) (0.182) (0.156) 
Other metal products 
0.132** 0.152*** -0.005 0.014 0.086 0.165*** -0.014 
(0.065) (0.053) (0.054) (0.068) (0.061) (0.056) (0.058) 
General purpose 
machinery  
-0.020 0.140* 0.148** 0.207** 0.309*** 0.262*** 0.177** 
(0.080) (0.075) (0.075) (0.091) (0.072) (0.067) (0.074) 
Domestic appliances 
n.e.c. 
0.156 0.010 0.203* 0.197 0.018 0.262*** -0.008 
(0.125) (0.090) (0.115) (0.158) (0.097) (0.083) (0.107) 
Medical appliances 
and instruments of 
precision 
0.127 -0.547** 0.057 0.256** -0.315*** -0.125 0.230 
(0.154) (0.214) (0.115) (0.113) (0.111) (0.155) (0.149) 
Motor vehicles 
0.085 0.490*** 0.438*** 0.405*** 0.302*** 0.321*** 0.351*** 
(0.092) (0.080) (0.094) (0.093) (0.070) (0.064) (0.075) 
Furniture 
0.161** 0.075 0.124* 0.063 0.009 0.157*** 0.077 
(0.071) (0.063) (0.067) (0.084) (0.076) (0.058) (0.069) 
Other manufacturing 
0.214* 0.137 -0.211** -0.157* -0.068 -0.115 0.186 
(0.118) (0.093) (0.106) (0.090) (0.150) (0.092) (0.127) 
                
Observations 1,265 1,397 1,395 1,321 1,344 1,885 1,669 
R-squared 0.409 0.404 0.538 0.452 0.451 0.469 0.424 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include region 
and level of education dummies.   
 
